We study the impact of frictions on the prevalence of systemic crises. Agents privately learn about a fixed payoff parameter, and repeatedly adjust their investments while facing transaction costs in a dynamic global game. The model has a rich structure of externalities: payoffs may depend on the volume of aggregate investment, on the concentration of investment, or on its volatility. We examine how small frictions, including those similar to the Tobin tax, affect the equilibrium. We identify conditions under which frictions discourage harmful behavior without compromising investment volume. The analysis is driven by a robust invariance result: the volume of aggregate investment (measured in a pivotal contingency) is invariant to a large family of frictions. 
Introduction
The recent economic crisis has led to a renewed interest in Tobin's proposal to "throw some sand in the wheels" of the economy.
1 One voice in the current public debate points to the stabilizing role of small frictions. The advocates of the transaction tax, such as France or Germany, believe that it would calm the self-fulfilling financial turmoils experienced in recent years. The opponents, such as the United Kingdom or the United States, worry that the tax may reduce financial liquidity or shift the investments outside of the taxing jurisdictions.
We examine the stabilizing role of frictions in a coordination game where both high and low economic activity can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In our model, the economic turmoils arise as rational reactions to evolving information: investors try to outguess the coordination outcome of the whole economy, and perpetually adjust their investment positions.
The frictions influence properties of the adjustment patterns, such as their volatility, thereby impacting real economic performance. In equilibrium, frictions can have a large effect on the prevalence of systemic crises.
We model the coordination of the economy in a dynamic global game. A continuum of agents gradually and privately learn about the fixed state of the economy, and repeatedly adjust their investment positions. An agent's payoff depends on her investment path and on the outcome of the economy, which either succeeds or fails. The outcome is a function of various statistics of investors' behavior, including the terminal volume of investment, the volatility of investment, the exit rate, or the dispersion of investment across agents. Allowing for general transaction costs, we examine how frictions impact these statistics and ultimately how they affect the likelihood of successful coordination in equilibrium.
The common rationale behind Tobin tax-like proposals can be traced back to Pigou's suggestion to tax actions generating negative externalities; frictions may deter volatile or other harmful investment patterns, the argument goes. However, frictions could backfire if economic performance depends on many aggregates of investment behavior, including the 1 See Tobin (1978) .
2 volume of aggregate investment. A policy maker may worry that the negative effect of frictions on the investment volume may dominate the benefits of reduced volatility. Within the studied model, we dispel such worries. The volume of aggregate investment at the end of the adjustment process (terminal volume henceforth) is invariant to a large class of frictions in a pivotal contingency -we call this the invariance result.
Let us illustrate the invariance result on an emerging economy attempting to attract investments and to discourage capital reversals. Exit penalties may help achieve the latter goal, but their effect on the investment volume is seemingly inconclusive. While investors become less likely to exit upon receiving bad news about the economy, they are also less likely to enter in the first place. In our model, these two effects offset each other exactly, and under general conditions. The volume of capital that the economy attracts and retains is independent of the frictions. Guided by this invariance result, the policy maker may introduce efficiency-enhancing frictions based on their effect on capital reversals only. Section 2 develops this example further.
The invariance result is driven by relatively weak assumptions. It holds under a large class of information structures that naturally extend those from the static global-games literature. The result is independent of many details of the frictions, and of other details of the investment incentives.
The invariance result provides a reliability test of the static global-game framework.
Static global games are a mainstream modelling tool for analyzing coordination processes;
see Morris and Shin (2003) for a review of applications. By nature, however, they omit all the dynamic aspects of the studied interactions. Our model distinguishes interactions in which the dynamic elements are important from those where static global games yield reliable predictions. Indeed, there are dynamic specifications of our model where the equilibrium reduces to the equilibrium of a simple static global game. This occurs in dynamic problems where the terminal investment volume is the only determinant of the economic outcome. In such settings, the explicit modelling of the learning process with action adjustments does not improve the predictions any more than to the static benchmark; frictions do not matter.
When economic success, however, depends on several statistics of investors' behavior, as in the example of the emerging economy, the dynamic elements of our model do impact equilibrium behavior. This can be seen in the context of another example.
Consider a dynamic extension of the currency attack model of Morris and Shin (1998) . In each period preceding the meeting of a currency board, speculators learn additional information about the fixed state of the economy and adjust their bets on the currency devaluation.
Suppose that the board's devaluation decision depends on the aggregate position of the speculators at the time of the meeting, but not on the history or cross-sectional distribution of the positions. As in the example of the emerging economy, the invariance result holds.
The terminal aggregate position is independent of the dynamic details of the game. This implies that, although the evolution of the attack may be sensitive to dynamic details, the ex ante equilibrium probability of the attack's success is not. If, however, the history or crosssectional distribution of the speculators' positions influence the board's decision, dynamic elements become relevant in equilibrium and frictions start to influence the prevalence of the attacks.
Our model is an intended compromise between the tractability of static global games and the richness of dynamic coordination processes. On the one hand, we explicitly model agents' learning and their adjustments to arriving information so that we can analyze the effects of frictions on dynamic investment paths. On the other hand, we do not keep track of flow payoffs, and thus we do not distinguish between early and late economic success. We also model social learning in a reduced form only. In a fully-fledged model of social learning, the agents would receive noisy signals about others' behavior. Since this behavior reflects, in equilibrium, the underlying state of the economy, social learning would lead to an update of agents' beliefs about the state. We simplify the problem by treating arriving information about the state exogenously. Such a reduced-form approach to social learning has been formalized in Dasgupta (2007) and used in Angeletos et al. (2007) , Angeletos and Werning 4 (2006) , and Goldstein et al. (2011) . Our compromise between the fully dynamic approach and the static equilibrium is in the tradition of the open-loop equilibria in dynamic games (see Fudenberg and Levine 1988) . The reduced-form approach to social learning allows us to characterize equilibrium, and thereby to perform a welfare analysis of tax policies in a general environment. Therefore, we view our model as a step towards providing a general testing ground for various Tobin tax-like proposals.
Let us now discuss our contribution in more detail. The invariance result is driven by the assumption that the local properties of the information structure are independent of the realized state; we call this translational symmetry. The same assumption underlies the existing static global-game characterizations. For example, selection of the risk-dominant action in Carlsson and van Damme (1993) or selection of the Laplacian 2 action in Morris and Shin (2003) are driven by this assumption. Kováč and Steiner (2008) use the symmetry to derive a partial equilibrium characterization in a two-stage global game. Although such a symmetry assumption drives uniqueness and characterization results in all global-game models, our invariance result and the analysis in a dynamic setting are novel.
3
As a second contribution, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of monotone equilibria in the dynamic model. The main challenge is to dispense with supermodularity, an assumption which drives existence results in static global games but whose intertemporal analog is overly restrictive. 4 Our third contribution consists of a characterization result. For settings with fast learning -that is, when the precision of the private information quickly increases across rounds -we show equilibrium existence, provide its characterization, and prove its independence from the assumed error distributions.
The importance of the dynamic aspects of coordination processes has been well recog-nized. One stream of the literature focuses on dynamic adjustments to an evolving economic environment, see Burdzy et al. (2001 ), or Chassang (2010 . Our paper falls into the class of dynamic models where agents learn about a fixed economic environment. In Chamley (2003), Angeletos and Werning (2006) , and Angeletos et al. (2007) agents learn from endogenous public signals such as prices or early coordination outcomes. Since the public signals restore common knowledge in these models, they typically exhibit equilibrium multiplicity. Dasgupta (2007) provides a particular but tractable model of private social learning, within a class of monotone equilibria, equivalent to the exogenous private learning process employed in this paper. Unlike the public learning processes, the private ones preserve strategic uncertainty and equilibrium uniqueness.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we formalize the example of the exit tax in an emerging economy. Section 3 describes the general model and highlights its symmetry property. Section 4 states and proves the invariance result. Section 5 demonstrates existence and characterization results when agents learn fast. Section 6 presents several applied settings in which we use the invariance result to design welfare-enhancing frictions.
Example: Sudden Investment Reversals
As an illustration, we design an intuitive welfare improving friction in a simple dynamic coordination game. An emerging economy is opening up to international capital. Foreign investors make decisions in an early and an interim stage of the economic transformation.
In the early stage, each investor i of the continuum [0, 1] invests 0 or 2 units in the economy.
The early decisions are partially reversible in the interim stage: those who have invested early can withdraw 1 unit, and those who have not invested early can invest 1 unit. We use the same action labels 0 and 1 at each decision node, as in In this example, the economy succeeds if it attracts enough investment, and if it does not experience too large capital reversal:
where
2 )di is the volume of capital reversal, and θ is the state of the economy.
We impose tax τ on the detrimental reversals. That is, the after-tax total payoff at path
The tax is levied only when an investor invests in the first round and withdraws in the second.
Intuitively, the tax should (and indeed does in our model) discourage both exit and entry, and thus it should reduce the volume of reversals. However, the effect on the investment volume b is a priori ambiguous. A policy maker may worry that the net effect on the investment volume will be negative and dominate the benefits of reduced capital reversals.
The overall tax effects cannot be understood without detailed modelling of strategic rounds and agents, where σ ∈ (0, 1/2) is a small scaling parameter. Thus, signal quality increases over time. As shown below, the results do not rely on a particular error distribution.
Investors do not observe opponents' actions.
We examine threshold equilibria of the following form: (i) there exists an endogenous critical state θ * such that the project succeeds for θ ≥ θ * , and fails for θ < θ * , and (ii) investors use threshold strategies: an agent at private action history h ∈ {∅, 1, 0} of length t = 0, 1 invests in round t + 1 if and only if
The private action history h indicates the action taken by the investor up to round t, ∅ being the null history at the beginning of the game. We have verified that the game has a unique threshold equilibrium for τ = 0, and 1/10, with critical state θ * (τ ).
Each investor knows the critical state θ * in equilibrium but not the realized θ. Based on her signal, the investor formulates her belief about the event that θ exceeds θ * , that is, that the economy succeeds. When the realized state is outside of the interval I(σ) = [θ * − 2σ, θ * + 2σ], the investors know the outcome of the project in each round because they receive signals far enough from θ * (see Figure 2a) . Investors invest and stay for states above the interval, and they never invest for states below. Inside I(σ), however, the stochastic learning leads to volatile investment; investment paths 10 and 01 may occur.
Investors' ex ante welfare is (approximately) determined by the critical state. When σ is small, the ex ante probability that the realized state is in I(σ) is negligible. Therefore, the ex ante expected utility of an investor is approximately 0 × Prob(θ < θ * ) + Prob(θ > θ * ) = (3 − θ * )/4. Thus, ex ante welfare is decreasing in the critical state; see Figure 2b for an illustration. Although the critical state is realized with zero probability, the behavior at θ * determines the equilibrium value of θ * (as shown in the equation below), and therefore the behavior in this contingency has a large indirect effect on ex-ante welfare. Thus, our analysis focuses on the characterization of the critical behavior.
The condition for success, (1), is met with equality in the critical state:
where b * and e * are the equilibrium values of investment volume b and reversal volume e in the critical state. They are computed as follows. We choose an arbitrary value of θ * and find the optimal thresholds x * h by solving a simple single agent optimization problem by backward induction. Then, conditioning on the realized state θ = θ * , we use the distribution of an investor's signals and the optimal thresholds to compute the probabilities of all investment paths, represented in Figure 3 . These probabilities are independent of the value of θ * chosen at the beginning of the computation. We use the probabilities to compute the expected values of investment and reversals, b * and e * .
The effect of the tax on the aggregate behavior in the critical state is depicted in Figure   3 . As expected, the tax τ discourages both exit and entry, and thus the critical volume of reversals e * decreases with the tax. The effect of the tax on the investment volume is less intuitive; it is invariant with respect to the tax; b * = 1 for both tax levels. 5 The decrease in b * caused by diminished early entry is exactly offset be the changes in behavior in the interim stage. Thus, the critical state θ * = 1 − b * + e * = e * is affected by the exit tax only via the decrease of the reversal volume e * . As a result of the tax, θ * (0) − θ * (1/10) > 0, and this difference is independent of σ.
The invariance of the critical investment holds under general conditions, which greatly simplifies the design of welfare improving frictions. In this example, the policy maker can focus on frictions' effect on reversals without worrying about investment volume. We conclude that the simple exit tax increases the ex ante probability that the emerging economy succeeds, and thus its expected welfare.
The Model
Our model generalizes the example in many directions. The game has arbitrary (finite) number of rounds. We make no distributional assumptions on the learning process. The payoff functions allow for general investment incentives and specifications of transaction costs. Finally, the outcome rule of the investment project may exhibit a broad class of externalities beyond those in the example.
5 Using Figure 3A 
Payoffs
A continuum of agents i ∈ [0, 1] make binary decisions a i t ∈ {0, 1} in rounds t ∈ {1, . . . , T }.
We write h i for a private action path (a i 1 , . . . , a i t ) up to round t = |h i |, denote the initial history at the beginning of the game by ∅, and often write z i ∈ {0, 1} T for terminal paths.
When not needed, we omit the index i. We let h(t ) be the truncation of h to the first t elements, and a(h, t ) be the t th action of h. For h = (a 1 , . . . , a t ) and h = (a 1 , . . . , a t ), we let hh be the path (a 1 , . . . , a t , a 1 , . . . , a t ) of length t + t .
Agent i's payoff u(z i , o) depends on her terminal path z i and on an outcome o ∈ {0, 1} interpreted as the failure or success of a common investment project. Since the outcome is binary, we can always express the payoffs as a linear function of o:
. We interpret b z as an agent's bet on the success of the project at the terminal path z -the agent receives the amount b z only if the project succeeds. The parameter c z is the cost of placing the bet via the path z. In the applications, c z will include transaction costs alongside the path z.
The outcome of the project is 
Learning Process
The state θ is an unobserved random variable drawn from a uniform distribution on a 
Strategies and Equilibrium
A pure strategy s is a family of functions s h (x t ), one for each h ∈
following strategy s plays action a t = s h (x t ) at each private history h of length t − 1. Since beliefs at round t are independent of earlier signals, so is the strategy. The independence of the strategy at round t from signals x 1 , . . . , x t−1 constrains only indifferent types, and these have generically zero measure. We say that s is a threshold strategy if, for each path h, there exists x * h such that s h (x) = 1 for x ≥ x * h , and s h (x) = 0 for x < x *
h . An outcome function O : R −→ {0, 1} specifies the outcome of the project; o = O(θ).
We say that O is a threshold outcome function if there exists a critical state θ * such that
Strategy s is a best response to outcome function O if
When O is a threshold outcome function with a critical state θ * we simply say that s is the best response to θ * . To avoid ambiguity, we assume that in the case of a tie, agents invest.
Then, the best response to any measurable outcome function O is uniquely defined.
Let z(x; s) be the terminal path that type x reaches if she follows strategy s. Assume that all agents use the same strategy s and that the Law of Large Numbers applies to the continuous population of agents. Then the aggregate success contribution d z(x i ;s) di in state θ equals the conditional expectation E d z(x i ;s) θ . The realized state θ determines the outcome of the project both through the conditional distribution of agents' behavior z (x i ; s) |θ and through the critical aggregate success contribution 1 − θ required for the success of the project. We say that outcome function O is generated by a strategy s if for
For all outcome functions considered below we assume without loss of generality that O(θ) = 13 1 for θ > θ max and O(θ) = 0 for θ < θ min . We extend the outcome function to all states on the real line for a technical reason; it simplifies the definition of a translation of O.
An equilibrium (O, s) is an outcome function O and a strategy s such that s is the best response to O, and O is generated by the strategy s. A pair (O, s) is a threshold equilibrium if both O and s are threshold functions.
Our equilibrium concept is a symmetric, pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Since the agents do not observe others' actions, the usual complications with off-equilibrium beliefs, common in dynamic games, do not arise. Our focus on symmetric, pure-strategy equilibria is essentially without loss of generality. All agents optimize against a common outcome function, and thus their best response strategies could differ or use mixed actions only at indifferent types, and these have generically zero measure.
Translational Symmetry
We conclude the description of the model by highlighting its important symmetry. The joint density of the state and the type, f (θ, x), is translation invariant: For any variable, we define its critical value as its expectation in the critical state θ * when all agents best-respond to θ * : for instance, critical success contribution is
where s is the best response to θ * .
Since both the joint distribution f (θ, x) and the best response function are translation invariant, the critical value of any variable is independent of θ * . This implies equilibrium uniqueness within an important class of equilibria:
Lemma 1. There exists at most one equilibrium (O, s) with a threshold outcome function O. If it exists then the critical state θ
Proofs omitted in the main text are relegated to Appendix.
Invariance of the Critical Investment
This section presents the main insight of the paper -the invariance result. We will show that the terminal volume of aggregate investment in the critical state θ * depends solely on payoffs received on extreme investment paths. By Lemma 1, the equilibrium is determined by the behavior at θ * . Thus, though the invariance result applies in only one -the criticalpayoff state, it will have strong consequences on the equilibrium and on the ex ante welfare.
Define the success premium
as the benefit benefit gained by an informed optimizing agent when the outcome changes from failure to success. Though the agents in the critical state are never perfectly informed about the outcome in our game, the success premium S, defined by optimization under complete information, happens to characterize the critical aggregate investment. Let s be the best response to θ * and let
denote the critical aggregate investment.
Invariance Result. The critical aggregate investment is
In particular, the critical investment is invariant to any policy that does not affect the extremal payoffs max z u(z, 1), and max z u(z, 0).
The term "policy" refers to any change in the payoff parameters b z or c z .
The result provides an immediate equilibrium characterization for settings where the outcome depends on the terminal investment volume, but not on other behavioral aggregates, such as volatility or dispersion of investment:
Corollary 1. Suppose that d z = b z for all z, and that an equilibrium with a threshold outcome function exists. Then:
1. the critical state θ * = 1 − S, 2. the ex ante probability of success is invariant to any policy that does not affect the extremal payoffs max z u(z, 1), and max z u(z, 0), and 3. the critical state of the dynamic game is identical to the critical state of the static global game in which agents simultaneously choose between the two extremal paths arg max z u(z, 1), and arg max z u(z, 0).
The corollary provides a robustness check for static global games. Let us illustrate this on the model of currency attacks by Morris and Shin (1998) Besides modelling considerations, the invariance result has policy implications. The critical state is independent of the transaction costs along all the non-extreme paths. Thus, frictions in the spirit of the Tobin tax that do not impact the payoffs on the extremal, nonvolatile paths do not influence equilibrium probability of successful coordination and welfare in this strategic situation.
The invariance result holds in settings with a general prior over θ as agents' posterior beliefs are approximately independent of the prior information when the private signals are sufficiently precise. 8 Let s(φ, σ) be the best response to θ * under prior φ(θ) when the scaling parameter is σ, and let b * (φ, σ) = E φ,σ b z(x;s(φ,σ)) θ * . We prove in the supplement that, as 7 Morris and Shin allow b 1 and c 1 to depend on the state θ. We discuss such an extension at the end of this section.
8 See Frankel et al. (2003) for an application of this argument to a large class of static global games.
σ → 0, the critical investment b * (φ, σ) converges to the success premium S.
Similarly, we conjecture that the invariance result can be extended to 
Sketch of Proof
We sketch the proof of the invariance result on the example from Section 2. The formal proof is in Appendix.
We fix the value of the critical state θ * throughout the discussion. Let
be the regret of an investor who has chosen investment path z = (a 1 , a 2 ) when the outcome is o. Abusing notation, let random variable r(x, o) be an investor's regret when she receives signals x = (x 1 , x 2 ), follows her optimal investment strategy s(x) against θ * , and the outcome happens to be o. Conditionally on the realized state being θ, we can compute the distribution of investors' signals. Using this distribution, we define functions r o (θ) for
; it is the expected regret under the optimal strategy s, when the outcome is o, conditional on the true state being θ.
The core of the proof is the observation that the optimal strategy equalizes expected regret in the critical state across success and failure:
The invariance result is a corollary of the regret equalization. Rearranging the last equation gives:
The left hand side is S (notice that S = 1 for both τ in the example from Section 2), and the right-hand side equals E x b z(x) |θ * = b * .
The regret equalization result (5) is implied by the translational invariance of the model.
Let us prove (5) by contradiction, using Figure 4 . When θ θ * , investors receive low signals in both rounds, and they know that the project will fail in equilibrium. Therefore, they do not invest. Thus, if the outcome were a success (o = 1), as assumed in the definition of r 1 , they would experience substantial regret, because they would wish they had invested in both rounds. Accordingly, r 1 (θ) = 1 for sufficiently low θ. As θ increases, an investor is more likely to draw high signals and invest, and thus her expected regret under o = 1 decreases until it becomes null. A symmetric argument explains why r 0 is increasing. The ex ante expected regret corresponds to the shaded area in Figure 4 . To see this, recall that when θ < θ * , the project fails (o = 0), and when θ > θ * , the project succeeds (o = 1). Therefore, for θ < θ * , the relevant conditional expected regret is given by r 0 , and for θ > θ * , it is given by r 1 .
To establish a contradiction, suppose that the optimal strategy s does not equalize regrets,
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as outlined in Figure 4a , where r 1 (θ * ) > r 0 (θ * ). Translating the threshold strategy s to the left, i.e. decreasing all the thresholds x * h by the same amount, translates the regret functions r 0 and r 1 to the left because the model exhibits translational symmetry. The translated strategy results in a lower expected regret, since the shaded area in Figure 4b is reduced by the area A. By the definition in (4), expected regret is obtained by subtracting expected utility from a constant. If expected regret can be decreased by translating the strategy, then expected utility can be increased, contradicting the optimality of the original strategy s.
Fast Learning
This section presents one of the tractable specifications of the general model. We establish equilibrium existence and characterization under mild restrictions on the payoffs, when the precision of agents' information increases greatly in each round. The online supplement contains an alternative tractable specification that does not restrict the learning process but it imposes stronger payoff restrictions.
To capture fast learning processes, we rescale the errors as
keeping densities f t (η t ) unaltered, and we examine the limit σ → 0. The essential property of fast learning is that the ratio of signal precisions across two rounds diverges as σ → 0. 9 We treat the limit of σ → 0 casually in the main text and relegate detailed proofs to Appendix.
We characterize the equilibrium under the assumption that an agent certain of success prefers action 1 while an agent certain of failure prefers the opposite action.
A1: For all histories h,
The results of this section hold if
where h ∈ {0, 1} T −|h|−1 is a continuation path.
Consider the best response to a critical state θ * . As σ vanishes, agents in each round expect to receive information in the next round that is vastly more precise than their current signal. However uncertain about the outcome an agent is in the current round t, she is nearly sure that she will know the outcome and play optimally in the subsequent rounds. Thus, an agent choosing action a at path h expects to receive payoff b ha1...1 − c ha1...1 if the project succeeds and −c ha0...0 if it fails. She invests if and only if she assigns probability at least p * h to success, where p * h solves the indifference condition
Assumption A1 guarantees that p * h exists, is unique, and lies in (0, 1). The equilibrium critical state θ * is characterized by agents' behavior in the critical state;
by Lemma 1:
To compute the critical success contribution d * , we analyze the distribution of posterior beliefs at θ * . Let q t (x t ) = Pr (θ ≥ θ * | x t ) be the posterior success probability evaluated by type x t in round t. In the critical state, the posterior beliefs reflect solely the noise in the private signals rather than information about the outcome. As a result, the posteriors are uniformly distributed in the critical state; q t (x t )|θ * ∼ U [0, 1] for any specification of the error distribution.
10
In the critical state, and at each history h, an agent chooses action 1 with probability
h . Additionally, in the limit of fast learning, the posterior beliefs q t are independent across rounds. Thus, in the limit as σ → 0, the probability that an agent 10 This property has been used in Guimaraes and Morris (2007) and in Steiner (2006) . The derivation is as follows. Let α = x t − θ be the error and A its c.d.f. Then Pr(q t (x t ) < p|θ * ) = Pr(x t < θ
reaches a terminal path z is
where, as before, a(z, t) denotes t'th action on the path z and z(t − 1) is the truncation of z to the first t − 1 rounds. This gives the following limit characterization result: Proposition 1. If A1 holds and there exists σ such that the game has a threshold equilibrium
We supplement the last result with a sufficient condition for the existence of a threshold equilibrium. It requires that investing contributes to success more than not investing, but the restriction is imposed only for the extreme continuation paths: The assumption is relatively weak as it leaves the ranking of success contributions on most paths unspecified, thus allowing for considerable modelling freedom.
Proposition 2. If A1 and A2 hold then there exists σ > 0 such that the game has a unique threshold equilibrium for each σ ∈ (0, σ].
Equilibrium uniqueness was established in Lemma 1. Thus it remains to prove existence.
To that end, we show in Appendix that the best response s to θ * generates a non-decreasing expected success contribution d(θ) = E d z(x;s) |θ . The main complication is that typical paths in a neighborhood of θ * are volatile, and thus assumption A2 does not rank their success contributions. The analysis simplifies when learning is fast. Then each agent at any point of the game assigns very high probability to her knowing the outcome in the next round. Hence, when learning is fast, agents believe that their continuation play will be alongside the extreme histories 11 . . . 1 or 00 . . . 0. As the proof shows, the incomplete ranking in A2 then suffices to establish monotonicity of d(θ).
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Applications
This section presents four specifications of the general model where the project outcome depends on the terminal aggregate investment and possibly on its distribution across investors or on its historical volatility. We characterize the effects of frictions on the ex ante success probability, relying on the invariance result. We focus on the limit of fast learning throughout the section.
Investment is only partially reversible and the investment opportunities decay over time in all four specifications. We formalize this as follows. Each investor decides whether to enter/stay in a project or exit/stay out of the project in each round. An investor who enters in round t in invests T + 1 − t in , and withdraws T + 1 − t out if she leaves the project at round t out . Therefore, an agent repeatedly entering and exiting at rounds t
We assign label 1 to the action entering/staying in, and 0 to the action exiting/staying out. An agent receives payoff 1/T per unit of investment if the project succeeds. Thus investor's total investment (or bet) is
This specification allows for an alternative interpretation. An agent decides at the beginning of each round whether to participate in the project in the current round, and her total investment equals the final number of rounds in which she has participated.
To study the effects of frictions, we specify
with c + τ < 1 so that assumption A1 is satisfied throughout this section. In words, the unit cost of investment is c/T with c ∈ (0, 1), and the agent pays penalty τ /T ≥ 0 per entry or exit. Entry at round 1 is not penalized (this is relaxed in Subsection 6.4).
We assume incentives (7) and (8) in all four applications, but we examine different structures of externalities by varying the success contributions d z . The encompassing specification for all the four applications is
By varying the curvature of the function ϕ we capture the impact of investment dispersion on the outcome. Parameter λ specifies the impact of volatility.
Reduction to the Static Game
This application formalizes our discussion of the currency attacks from Section 4. The outcome depends only on the terminal aggregate investment; d z = b z . Assumption A2 holds, and thus the game has a unique threshold equilibrium for sufficiently small σ. Corollary 1 implies:
In this setting, the outcome of the dynamic game with T > 1 reduces to the outcome of the static game with T = 1. The dynamic features of the model are unimportant, and the tax is ineffective.
In the subsequent applications, the outcome depends on additional aspects of investment behavior, apart of its terminal volume. Thus, Corollary 1 cannot be applied, and the dynamic model does not reduce to a static game. Yet, the invariance result will be helpful because it implies that the tax affects the equilibrium only via aggregates of behavior other than the terminal investment volume.
Frictions and Volatility of Investment
We assume that volatility ceteris paribus hampers the outcome: the success contributions are d z = b z − λv z . When λ < 1/2, assumption A2 holds and the game has a unique threshold equilibrium for sufficiently small σ.
Using Proposition 1, we can explicitly compute the distribution of the terminal paths z in the critical state, and thus also the critical volatility v * defined as E[v z | θ * ]. As one would expect, the critical volatility v * decreases when a small friction τ is introduced. This, combined with the invariance of the critical investment b * , formalizes Tobin's intuition:
Proposition 4. Introduction of a small transaction cost τ increases the ex ante success probability (and thus welfare):
< 0.
Frictions and Concentration of Investment
In this application, we describe the effect of frictions on the cross-sectional distribution of investment across agents. The management and finance literature (e.g. Carlin and Mayer (2003), or Huddart (1993) ) has pointed out several channels through which the concentration of investment may affect the outcome of a project. Investment concentrated among few investors may help mitigate the free-riding problem associated with monitoring of the project.
On the other hand, dispersed investment is beneficial when delegation from investors to managers fosters success, as small investment levels make such delegation credible.
To capture such effects, we consider success contributions d z = ϕ(b z ) with ϕ increasing and convex or concave -in the convex case concentrated investment fosters and in the concave case hampers the success. Assumption A2 holds, so the game has a unique threshold equilibrium when learning is sufficiently fast.
Let us analyze how the frictions affect the distribution of investment across agents in the critical state. As before, the terminal volume of investment is invariant to frictions. The distribution of investment, however, varies with the level of friction. When frictions are low, agents switch actions often and arrive at investment dispersed among many investors. When frictions are high, investment will be concentrated among those investors who, by accident, happened to be optimistic at the beginning of the game and have invested. Because of the high frictions, they tend to stay in the project and arrive at high investment levels. The next lemma formalizes this using the concept of mean-preserving spread of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) .
Lemma 2. Consider τ, τ ∈ [0, 1 − c), τ < τ . The limit distribution of b z |θ * under τ is a mean-preserving spread of the limit distribution of b z |θ * under τ .
Thus, the effect of the frictions on the ex ante success probability is unambiguous when ϕ is convex or concave:
Proposition 5. 1. If concentrated investment ceteris paribus fosters success then frictions increase the ex ante success probability: if ϕ is convex, then θ * (τ ) is decreasing in τ .
2. If concentrated investment ceteris paribus hampers success then frictions decrease the ex ante success probability: if ϕ is concave, then θ * (τ ) is increasing in τ .
Long-Horizon Games
Finally, we assume that both the cross-sectional distribution and the volatility of investment influence the project's outcome. Let the success contribution be d z = ϕ(b z ) − λv z with ϕ increasing, twice differentiable, but not necessarily convex or concave. We abandon the simplifying assumption that investment in the first round is not penalized. By convention, we count investment in round 1 as entry; i.e. we set a(z, 0) = 0 for all z, and we modify the definition of the volatility to v z = 1 T T t=1 a(z, t) − a(z, t − 1) . When 2λ < ϕ (b) for every b, then A2 holds and the game has a unique threshold equilibrium for sufficiently small σ.
We focus on long horizon, T → ∞. The invariance result applies in this case in a stronger form. First, unlike in the finite-horizon games, the small entry penalty does not distort the critical investment b * . When investors pay an entry penalty in the first round, the invariance of b * T does not hold for finite T because the payoff for the extreme path 11 . . . 1 varies with τ .
However, as T becomes large, the aggregate investment b *
approximates 1 − c; the first-round entry penalty becomes negligible compared to the overall incentives.
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Second, the effect of frictions on the distribution of investment, emphasized in the previous subsection, diminishes for large horizons. When agents adjust to their randomly evolving posteriors in many rounds, the Law of Large Numbers applies and the dispersion in the number of rounds that agents spend in the project becomes negligible. Therefore, the first part of
which is independent of the friction τ .
Finally, we analyze investment volatility. We find that the effect of frictions on volatility is large and non-vanishing in the long-horizon games. W explicitly compute the distribution of the terminal paths z in the critical state, and show in Appendix that v * T converges to
, as T → ∞. The next proposition summarizes:
Proposition 6. Frictions foster the ex ante success probability in long-horizon games:
where the right hand side decreases in τ .
In the long-horizon games, frictions do not significantly affect volume of aggregate investment, nor its dispersion across investors. Yet, the frictions significantly reduce volatility of investment in the critical state, thus increasing equilibrium ex ante welfare.
Conclusion
This paper presents a tractable dynamic global game in which agents privately learn from an exogenous stream of information and repeatedly adjust their actions. The framework is sufficiently rich to allow for the design of welfare-enhancing frictions. The design problem is simplified by the fact that aggregate investment (in a critical contingency) is invariant to a large family of frictions. Thus, a policy maker, using frictions to influence the volatility or concentration of investment, need not worry about compromising the volume of investment. We have focused on a dynamic extension of a so-called regime change game in which the outcome of the project is binary. Such a setting exhibits a well-defined critical state separating regions of success and failure, which simplified our analysis. Many applications, however, exhibit several degrees of success. Our preliminary results suggest that the invariance result extends to settings with a finite number of outcomes, and thus we believe that the assumption of the binary outcome space is not driving the main result.
One obvious direction for future research is to endogenize the learning process by social learning -that is, by assuming that agents learn from private noisy observations of the early actions of others. The details of social learning would likely alter the equilibrium coordination outcome. Our model, with the exogenous learning process, provides a benchmark for such an exercise.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of the Result from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider an equilibrium with critical state θ * . Then E d z(x;s) θ ≥ 1−θ for all θ > θ * , and E d z(x;s) θ < 1 − θ for θ < θ * . Continuity of E d z(x;s) θ with respect
The right-hand side is independent of θ * , as discussed at the end of Section 3.4. Moreover, d * is also independent of σ as the model is scale invariant: under two values σ and σ , the best responses to θ * satisfy s h (θ * + σε; σ) = s h (θ * + σ ε; σ ), and therefore Pr σ ( z(x; s(σ)) = z | θ * ) = Pr σ ( z(x; s(σ )) = z | θ * ) for any terminal path z .
A.2 Proof of the Result from Section 4
Proof of the Invariance Result. We will prove that an agent's expected regret in the critical state θ * is independent of the outcome: defining regret as
we prove that if agents play best-response s to θ * then the expected regret is equalized across the success and the failure in the critical state θ * :
Rearranging (10) immediately gives the invariance result:
The left-hand side is S, which establishes (3), as needed.
The regret equalization (10) is implied by the following: once the agent optimizes her strategy s against θ * , her ex ante expected regret cannot be decreased by a change in θ * :
E R z(x; s), 1 θ≥θ * ≥ E R z(x; s), 1 θ≥θ * ,
where 1 θ≥θ * is the threshold outcome function with the critical stateθ * . Before we derive (11), we first show how it implies (10).
Consider two thresholds θ * and θ * + δ, δ > 0. Since the outcome O(θ) differs only when
The left-hand side is non-positive for any δ by optimality of θ * , (11). Since E R z(x; s), o θ is continuous in θ, we have proved that 0 ≥ E R z(x; s), 1 − R z(x; s), 0 θ * .
Considering δ < 0 leads to the opposite inequality.
The last step of the proof, the derivation of (11), relies on the translational symmetry of the model, on (2). For any strategyŝ and its translations h (x) =ŝ h (x + δ) the following holds: the distribution of action paths z(x;ŝ) | θ under symmetric profileŝ, conditional on the realization of the fundamental θ equals distribution z(x;s) | (θ − δ) unders, conditional on the fundamental being θ − δ. Thus, for any outcome functionÔ, and its translatioñ
Letting s be the leftward translation of the optimal strategy s, s h (x) = s h (x + δ), we have E R z(x; s), 1 θ≥θ * +δ = E R z(x; s ), 1 θ≥θ * ≥ E R z(x; s), 1 θ≥θ * .
The last inequality holds because s is the best response to θ * , and, under the definition (9), payoff maximization is trivially equivalent to regret minimization. Comparing the left and right hand sides gives (11).
A.3 Proofs of the Results from Section 5
Let us review the fast learning specification. Recall
error η t has a continuous density f t with bounded support, and f t is bounded from above and below by some positive f and f . We refer to ε i t =
as cumulative error and denote its density by α σ t ; it is bounded from above uniformly across all σ ∈ (0, 1] and converges to f t as σ → 0. Similarly, for t < t, x t −x t = t−1 τ =t σ τ η τ and thus there exists α such that the conditional density of x t |x t is bounded from above by α σ t , for all σ ∈ (0, 1]. The following lemma summarizes the heuristic derivation of the optimal strategy from Section 5.
Lemma 3. If A1 holds then 1. there exists σ such that for all σ < σ, the best response to θ * is a threshold strategy,
h , where p * h ∈ (0, 1) solves the indifference condition (6).
The second statement implies that the threshold type x * h (σ) assigns probability p * h to the success, as σ → 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. Claim 1: Let
denote the incentive to invest of the type x t at history h. We will establish single-crossing of π σ h (x t ) for each h and sufficiently small σ.
Type x t forms beliefs at round t about her signal x t+1 in the next round. If x t+1 > θ * + t + 1 that the project will succeed (fail). The probability that the agent will be certain that the project succeeds at t + 1, given x t , is
The derivative with respect to x t of the sum of the first and the third terms is (c h10.
which is positive and of the order 1 σ t because the term in the square brackets is positive by A1 and f t xt−θ * σ t is bounded from below by a constant f .
The derivative of the second term is
Term M (x t+1 ) is bounded as payoffs are bounded. The derivative f t is bounded as well as error densities are assumed to be continuously differentiable. The whole integral is of the order σ t+1 1 σ 2t = 1 σ t−1 . Thus, for sufficiently small σ, the sum of derivatives of the first, third and the second term is positive; that is, d dxt π h (x t ) is positive on the middle interval in (13).
For small σ, π σ h (x t ) is negative on the first interval, positive on the third interval, increasing on the middle interval and continuous. Thus, the indifference condition π σ h (x t ) = 0 has a unique solution x * h (σ). Claim 2: Equation (14) implies that, as σ → 0, π σ h (θ * + σ t ε) converges, uniformly across
converges to the solution of the limit indifference condition (6).
We establish a bound on |Pr(R h | x t−1 + δ) − Pr(R h | x t−1 )|. Let z t (x) be the first t elements of z(x; s). Using this notation, Pr(R h | x t−1 ) = Pr(z t−2 (x) = h | x t−1 ), and
Recalling that the distribution of x is translation invariant, the last expression equals Pr (z t−2 (x + δe) = h | x t−1 ). Furthermore
where we used in the last step that, for τ < t − 1, the conditional density of x τ | x t−1 is bounded by 
A.4 Proofs of the Results from Section 6
Proof of Proposition 4. Critical volatility v * = v ∅ /T where v ∅ is defined recursively as: of τ by the invariance result, and thus it suffices to prove that dv ∅ dτ τ =0 < 0. We will prove this by induction over the length of the history h.
First, we let the reader verify that dv h dτ τ =0
< 0 when |h| = T − 1. Next, consider h of length 1 . . . T − 2, and assume dv h dτ τ =0
< 0 for histories h of length |h| + 1.
dv h1 dτ τ =0 + dp * h dτ τ =0 (v h0 − v h1 ) .
Using the expressions for p * h , it is straightforward to verify that the first summand is negative. The second and the third summands are negative by the induction hypothesis. The fourth summand is zero as v h0 = v h1 when τ = 0. The last statement holds because the optimal strategy is history-independent when τ = 0.
Finally,
dv 1 dτ τ =0 + dp
Fix τ and omit it from the notation for now. Recall that
is the probability of reaching path h in the critical state, and let L T be lottery (b z ) z ; (l z ) z .
Define the success premium at path h as We can rewrite the indifference condition (6) as
where 1 − p * h is the probability that agent chooses action 1 at path h, conditional on the state being θ * . Thus, for each t = 1, . . . , T , the lottery L t can be identified with the compound lottery (Q h ) h:|h|=t−1 ; (l h ) h:|h|=t−1 , where Q h = (S h0 , S h1 ; p * h , 1 − p * h ) has mean S h . We will prove by induction over t that L T (τ ) L T (τ ) for each τ, τ ∈ [0, 1 − c), τ > τ.
Notice that L 1 (τ ) L 1 (τ ) because both lotteries have identical means equal to S ∅ = S, and support of L 1 (τ ) is {S 0 (τ ), S 1 (τ )} =
(1−c)(T −1)−τ T ,
(1−c)(T −1)+1+τ T , forτ ∈ {τ, τ }. Thus
{S 0 (τ ), S 1 (τ )} is a spread of {S 0 (τ ), S 1 (τ )}.
From now on, we write variables associated with tax τ with an apostrophe and variables associated with τ without an apostrophe. For instance, we use L t = L t (τ ) and L t = L t (τ ).
Assume for induction L t−1 L t−1 , so that for each h of length t − 1 there exists a lottery Z h with support S g g:|g|=t−1 and probabilities (z and for g of length T , S g (τ ) = b g . Fix any path h of length t−1. Then for any τ, τ ∈ [0, 1−c), τ < τ , the following holds: S g (τ ) ≤ S h0 (τ ) or S g (τ ) ≥ S h1 (τ ) for all g of length t, the inequality is strict for at least some g, and min g S g (τ ) ≤ S h0 (τ ) < S h1 (τ ) ≤ max g S g (τ ).
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that in the critical state θ * , and in the limit σ → 0, the agent invests at path h with probability 1 − p * h where p * h is the solution of the indifference condition (6). For all histories of length t < T − 1, p * h = c+2τ 1+2τ if h ends with action 0, and p
